Settlement Offer Pursue Suit Embedded Nash

Exponential Utility R			
1000	200,000	1M	Risk Neutral
12,400,000	12,400,000	12,400,000	12,400,000
1,625	325,113	1,613,858	20,630,000
22,432	2,359,000	8,319,200	59,223,000

**Certainty Equivalents** 


Table 1

Settlement Offer Pursue Suit Observed Payout

Log Utility	Power -1	Linear
972,600	972,600	972,600
57,034	12,364	750,621
420,973	27,444	1,233,758

Equivalent consumption per year for 65 years

Table 2



Agree 62 38 0.2 1 takes all 62 38 80 Disagree 52 Agree 28 8.0 Nash Bargain II 45 35 45 35 Disagree 30 20

Figure 2: Embedded Nash Bargaining Example

Example: The top number in the box below each node represents the payoff to the first bargainer, and the lower number represents the payoff to the second bargainer. In the first stage there are 100 units to be divided. Disagreement at the first stage leads to a loss of 20 units, leaving 80 to be divided. Disagreement at the second stage leads to an additional loss of 30 units, leaving 50 divided in the disagreement point.

Figure 3: Embedded Nash Bargaining (Risk Neutral Case)




Figure 4: Embedded Nash Bargaining (Exponential Utility Case)

