Policy Seminars
Speaker: James Roberts |
Northwestern |
Topic: Unobserved Heterogeneity and Reserve Prices in Auctions |
Date/Place/Time: Friday, Jan. 30, 2009 1:30PM - 3:00PM UCLA Anderson School C303 |
Abstract: This study addresses the need to account for unobserved heterogeneity in auctions in order to improve our estimates of the distribution of bidder values. Though the empirical auction literature is vast, few studies allow for there to be differences in the objects being auctioned which are unobservable to the researcher. The method presented in this paper presents an intuitive, easy to implement procedure for dealing with unobserved heterogeneity with fairly sparse data across many auction formats. Unlike previous research, the procedure described herein uses seller behavior and the information contained in reserve prices to allow the distribution of bidders' private signals to depend on the realization of the unobserved heterogeneity. Importantly, I do not require sellers to set their reserve prices optimally, but rather I make the identifying assumption that reserve prices are monotonic in the realization of unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, the model can be estimated using only transaction prices even when the observed heterogeneity is of high dimension. I propose an estimation method and derive the asymptotic distribution of the proposed estimator. Working with data on used car auctions from South Korea I show that using reserve prices improves the estimates of within-auction variation in bids and that neglecting unobserved heterogeneity leads to an upward bias in estimated bidder surplus. I then perform counterfactual experiments regarding the optimal reserve price and price discrimination by the auction house to demonstrate that accounting for unobserved heterogeneity can alter predicted outcomes dramatically. |
Link to paper (if available): Click here for paper |