|Speaker: John Morgan|
|Topic: Voluntary Voting: Costs and Benefits|
|Date/Place/Time: Friday, Dec 5, 2008 1:30pm-3:00pm
UCLA Anderson School -- Entrepreneurs Hall C303
We study strategic voting in a Condorcet type model in which voters have identical preferences but differential information. Voting is costly and voluntary. We show that under majority rule with voluntary voting, it is an equilibrium
to vote sincerely. Thus, in contrast to situations with compulsory voting, there is no conflict between strategic and sincere behavior. In large elections, the equilibrium is shown to be unique. Furthermore, participation rates are such
that, in the limit, the correct candidate is elected with probability one. Finally, when voting is costless, a social planner cannot improve over a purely voluntary voting scheme.
|Link to paper (if available): Click here for Paper|